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"SOMEONE GET THE GOVERNOR AN ASPIRIN":
ROSS STERLING AND MARTIAL LAW IN EAST TEXAS
by Page S. Foshee

In 1930 Ross S. Sterling won the Democratic primary race for the Texas
governorship. He defeated ten other contenders - including fonner governor
Miriam A. "Ma" Ferguson - to succeed popular, two-term Democrat Dan
Moody. Because Texas was essentially a single-party state, winning the
primary ensured a candidate's ultimate election to office. Despite the onerous
demands placed upon him by the campaign, Sterling soon confronted
economic problems that made the primary election fight a pleasant memory.l
The Texas economy during the early years of the Great Depression relied
upon the production of two commodities: cotton and oil. The inherent
capriciousness of both industries exacerbated the already painful effects the
Great Depression had on farmers and oil men. Cotton production depended
upon adequate rain and sunshine appearing in the correct proportions. in the
proper sequence, for the right length of time. Success in the discovery and
production of oil required equal amounts of geological skill, persuasive ability,
dogged determination, and good luck. Although Texas cotton farmers and oil
men regarded their futures as blessed or danmed by their own hands and lands,
their fate depended upon the actions of foreign governments and of their
neighbors in other states; in 1931 no fann field or oil patch could remain
insulated from external economic factors. The collapse of both cotton and oil
prices forced Governor Sterling to alter his philosophy regarding the
relationship between government and private enterprise to shore up the price
of cotton and, quite possibly, to save the oil industry from ruin.
Ross Sterling's background made it difficult for him to impose state
government controls upon farmers and businessmen. Born in 1875 to a rural
merchant near Anahuac, Texas, Sterling quit school at the age of thirteen and
ten years later built his first country store. By 1904 Sterling operated stores in
the oil field boomtowns of Batson, Saratoga, Sour Lake, and Humble. Oilmen
needed feed for mules and horses; Sterling accumulated both feed contracts
and friends in the oil patch. In 1907 Sterling closed his store in Batson and
bought fOUf small state banks from a panic-distressed Fort Worth lawyer,
integrating them into his Humble. Saratoga, and Sour Lake operations. From
these small, diversified enterprises Sterling began to amass his fortune. 2
In 1911, Sterling and several friends founded the Humble Oil Company.
The initial partners included Sterling, Joe Fincher, Clint Wood, and C. D.

Goddard. Humble proved so profitable that Sterling sold his store and bank
holdings to concentrate on the oil company. Through skillful geological
exploration and shrewd bargaining with Gulf Oil Company, primary lease
owner in the Goose Creek oil field, Sterling secured his company's position.
Goose Creek, condemned by Gulf as only marginally productive, made
Humble a major Texas oil producer. In 1917 the Humble Oil Company
Page S. Foshee h an oj! and gas lease broker living in Austin, Texas.
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obtained the first charter under a new Texas oil pipeline law and its name was
changed to Humble Oil & Refming Company. Incorporators of the expanded
company included Sterling, William S. Farish (future president of Humble
Oil), Joe Fincher, Clint Wood, C.D. Goddard, Edgar Townes, Frank Sterling
(Sterling's father), Jesse H. Jones, Henry C. Weiss, and Walter Fondren.
Shortly thereafter, Humble's directors decided that the company needed to
refine its own crude. \
The corporation required additional capital to build its proposed refinery
in Baytown. One winter morning in 1918, while on a fund-raising trip in the
northeastern United States, William Farish met an old friend on a New York
City sidewalk. This chance encounter had far-reaching effects for Humble.
Farish told his friend, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey president Walter
Teagle, about his quest for capital. Teagle quickly arranged for Sterling and the
other partners to come to New York and negotiate terms of a loan from
Standard. Humble wanted to borrow $20 million, but Standard would loan no
more than $17 million. When Sterling acquiesced to the lower figure, Teagle
agreed to advance the funds on one final condition: that Standard take, as its
"customary fee," fifty-one percent of Humble's stock. Sterling rose from the
bargaining table and stalked toward the door, then stopped. Too pragmatic to
permit pride to destroy the company, he turned to Teagle and agreed to
relinquish exactly fifty percent of Humble Oil's stock as a "loan origination
fee." The Standard executive paused, then capitulated. 4
Sterling pursued other business interests while actively involved in
managing Humble Oil. In 1925, at the age of fifty, he sold his Humble shares
and retired from the oil business to oversee his other operations. He owned the
Houston Post-Dispatch, a combination of his Dispatch and Post newspapers,
which he had purchased in 1923 and 1924, respectively. In 1925, Sterling's
radio station KPRC ("Kotton Port Rail Center") began broadcasting from atop
the Post-Dispatch Building located in downtown Houston. He also owned the
American Maid Flour Mills and controlling interest in the Houston National
Bank. From this corporate setting Sterling answered Governor Dan Moody's
call to public service in Austin. 5
In the 1926 Democratic primary, Texas Attorney General Dan Moody
defeated Ma Ferguson in her bid for a second term as governor. The bitter
campaign COT the Democratic nomination followed a year-long investigation of
the suspicious letting of highway construction contracts. As attorney general,
Moody exposed the criminal relationship between highway commission
members and the American Road Company of Dallas. Tn December 1925,
Moody won his suit against American in the 53d U.S. District Court in Austin,
propelling him to the governor's office. Once sworn in, he called upon Ross
Sterling to chair the state highway commission. When Moody declined to run
for a third term as governor in 1930, Sterling pennitted friends to draft him
into the primary race.~
Campaigning vigorously against the irrepressible Mrs. Ferguson, Sterling
capitalized on his reputation for integrity and fiscal responsibility. He
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launched his campaign in Huntsville on June 20, 1930, calling for improved
highways funded by a $300 to $350 million bond issue, agricultural aid,
consolidation of redundant state departments, and prison reform. His highway
funding scheme drew the most derision, especially from Mrs. Ferguson's chief
campaigner, husband and former governor James "Pa" Ferguson. During the
runoff contest Ferguson asserted that Sterling knew nothing of governmental
affairs. Referring to Ferguson's earlier impeachment and his close proximity
to the highway commission contract scandals in 1925, Sterling responded, "J
know enough to tell the state's money and my money apart." The former
oilman won the party's runoff contest by capturing fifty-five percent of the
vote. On the second Tuesday of November 1930 Texans cast eighty percent of
their votes for Sterling, awarding him their state's highest office. Texas Weekly
editor Peter Molyneaux eagerly anticipated an administration overseen by
businessman Sterling, whom he viewed as a pragmatic, able, and fair chief
executive. As events unfolded during his term, Sterling would need all the
popular support he carried with him to Austin. He had won a difficult contest,
but his greatest challenges lay ahead.?
On October 5, 1930, a Sunday, Columbus Marion "Dad" Joiner, a "poorboy" oil promoter and well driller, completed his third oil well on Daisy
Bradford's farm, located in Rusk County between Henderson and Overton.
The first two wells had been "dusters," dry holes. If Joiner failed on the third
attempt, he would be out of business. He and his geologist-promoter, A.D.
"Doc" Lloyd, drilled in an area regarded by expert.~ as worthless pasture.
Because rumors of wealth spread swiftly throughout East Texas, a crowd was
on hand when the Daisy Bradford No.3 blew in at the astounding rate of 6,800
barrels, or 285,600 gallons, of oil per day. The earth's largess soon proved to
be one of the greatest problems that Ross Sterling faced as governor. s
Oilmen all over Texas wondered whether Joiner's wen was in a small
pocket of oil or if the wildcatter had tapped a "pool?" Subsequent events
answered this question resoundingly. On December 28, 1930, oll prospector
Ed Bateman, drilling on the Crim property southwest of Kilgore, hrought in
the Lou Della erim No. I well at a daily rate of 22,000 barrels (924,000
gallons) of oil. Thirteen miles separated the Bradford and Crim wells, both of
which were producing from the Woodbine Sand strata. This discovery agitated
oil industry executives and brought the field to the attention of major
companies, most of which had previously believed that the area held little
promise. Then, on January 26, 1931, W.A. Moncrief, John Ferrell, and Edward
A. Showers completed the Lathrop No.1 well, situated between the Gregg
County towns of Gladewater and Longview, and the majors began scrambling
for lease acreage over what appeared to be a huge sea of oil. The Lathrop well
established the limits of the East Texas field. At its greatest extent, the field
underlay Rusk, Smith, Upshur, and Gregg Counties in a strip forty-five miles
long and five to twelve miles wide. Dubbed the "Black Giant," the East Texas
was the world's largest oil field.~
Up to the time of the Bateman discovery, Southern Crude Oil Purchasing,
Pure Oil, the Texas Company, Magnolia Petroleum, Sun Oil, and Humble Oil
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and Refining had been the only large companies to purcha~e oil leases from
area landowners; independent landmen and small operators owned most of the
field's leases. This balance began to shift as shoestring operators such as Ed
Bateman sold their interests in the field to major companies. On January 9,
1931, even before the size of the East Texas field became apparent, Humble
Oil and Refining Company paid Bateman's $2.1 million asking price for the
Cnm well and the rest of the 1,494 acres upon which he had valid leases. JO
The rush to drill wells in East Texas, spurred by the legal particulars of
petroleum ownership, resulted in greatly escalated production that drove the
value of oil down sharply. Petroleum, a migratory entity trapped in porous,
subsurlace strata, migrates to the point of least compression. When a well is
drilled into an oil-bearing stratum, water, gas, or a combination thereof will
drive liquid hydrocarbons through the stratum to the pressure-relieving hole.
If oil is removed from a fonnation too quickly, the natural driving elements
will be damaged pennanently. Rapid extraction leaves a great deal of
petroleum in the earth. Because of oil '8 migratory nature, it respects no surface
boundaries. The legal theory known as the "rule of capture" applies; he who
brings the oil to the surface owns it. Because neighbors may drain oil from
beneath each other's property, everyone in the East Texas field rushed to drill
on their tracts. I I
Falling prices and irreversible reservoir damage concerned Governor
Sterling. As additional wells began producing crude oil prices faltered, then
slipped, and, finally, hurtled downward. As an oilman, Sterling knew the
damage being wrought in East Texas. As governor, he understood that the
ultimate responsibility for protecting Texas' natural resources belonged to him.
The Texas Railroad Commission was responsible for establishing oil proration
limits; that is, the maximum daily amount of crude each well could produce.
Texas law required that the commission prevent physical, not economic, waste
of hydrocarbons. 12
But the commission had already suffered a setback in both its prestige
and authority. On August 27, J 930, more than one month before Dad Joiner
completed the Daisy Bradford No.3 well, the railroad commission set the
statewide maximum allowable production at 750JX)(} barrels per day. This
50,OOO-barrel reduction from 1929 provoked an angry response. On August
30, 1930, the Danciger Oil and Refining Company filed suit against the
commission in state district court, alleging that the agency had set the
allowable figure at 750,000 barrels only to support the price of crude, and the
order had no relation to physical waste. Danciger secured a temporary
injunction pennitting it to operate freely, thus hampering commission efforts
to establish proration as a means to conserve resources. In February 1931, the
state court held that the commission had not exceeded its legal bounds in the
Danciger case and that effects on crude prices resulting from the order were a
side issue. Danciger appealed the ruling. Because of the pending appeal, the
commission appeared unwilling, during the spring of 1931, to take additional
action that could provoke legal challenges. In addition, the commission's order
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preceded discovery of the East Texas field, so operators there could legally
produce a'i much oil as they wished. 13
As crude prices continued their precipitous slide, Oklahoma Governor
William H. "Alfalfa Bill" Murray convened a meeting of oil-state governors at
the Texas Hotel in Fort Worth on February 28 and March I, 1931. Sterling and
representatives of New Mexico and Kansas governors attended and created a
Governors' Advisory Committee. They sent telegrams to the presidents of
major operators and requested that President Herbert Hoover host a conference
on oil imports. The meeting also generated a scheme to levy a one-twentiethof-one percent tax on gross production to pay state "oil umpires" to oversee
production and maintain proration orders. On March 16, stating that "the
present condition creates a great and critical public emergency," Sterling
submitted his plan for the establishment of an oil conservation commission to
the legislature. The measure went nowhere. The price of oil continued to fall;
the oil industry was clearly spiraling out of control, and measures had to be
enacted lO calm the situation. Government intervention in the form of
proration regulations seemed the only solution to overproduction. 14
Proration divided oilmen and royalty owners everywhere. Pro- and antiprorationists deluged Governor Sterling with letters and telegrams pleading
their side of the issue. On February 6, 300 landowners and small oil operators
met in Overton, Texas, and formed the East Texas Lease and Royalty Owners
Association to fight proration. In a fit of pique, "Doc" Lloyd called for
regulations to prohibit the railroad commission from issuing proration orders.
He then alleged that Humble Oil controlled prices in the East Texas field.
Whipped into a righteous frenzy by Lloyd, the Royalty Owners Association
hired fonner governor Dan Moody to plead its case in Austin. Dallas oilman
Robert Penn - accused by Lloyd of being Humble's "lapdog" - headed the
pro-regulation group. Both small independent and large national oil producers
claimed membership in Penn's organization. Humble Oil pres.ident William S.
Farish had long believed that the industry could take care of its own affairs
without governmental meddling; producer-imposed proration in the Yates field
in West Texas proved Farish's point. The Yates discovery in December 1926
followed closcly on the heels of large finds in the United States, Venezuela,
Columbia, and Sumatra, making overproduction and falling prices distinct
possibilities. But Humble, Marathon, and other operators agreed to produce
only 30,000 barrels per day in the Yates field, even though the fjeld's daily
capability stood at 192,000 barrels. By exercising restraint, the companies had
prevented both physical and economic wa'\tc. 15
The sennon of self-control fell upon the deaf ears of East Texans who had
extended themselves to poor-boy a well and needed cash flow to recover their
investment. Small independents operated the majority of the field's wells and
well-drilling outfits. They werc convinced that the large concerns could drive
oil prices down to intolerable levels and wait them out until all the "little guys"
had either gone out of business or were forced to sell their interests to
companies such as SUll Magnolia, or Humble.
j
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While legislators produced no law to the governor's liking, the railroad
commission called a public hearing for March 24 to detennine how best to
handle the volatile East Texas situation. Led by Carl Estes, firebrand editor of
the Tyler Journal, members of the East Texas Lease and Royalty Owners
Association planned to attend the commission hearing. Estes called for a
"march on Austin"' to show unified support for free and unrestricted
production and announced that a special train would be available for the trip
south. On March 24, thirteen chartered PuJlman cars arrived in Austin and
discharged landowners, royalty owners, and small operators determined to
keep proration out of Ea'\t Texas. 16

This contingent kept the hearing lively. At one point, debate between
Moody and Penn nearly erupted into fisticuffs. The line between politics and
spectacle was negligible; the audience enjoyed the antics and cheered their
respective advocates. Despite the histrionics, on April 4, 1931, the railroad
commission prescribed allowable limits for the East Texas field. Effective May
I, operators legally could produce 160,000 barrels of oil per day on a fieldwide basis. Commissioners divided the field into twenty-acre tracts for
proration purposes, pennitting each tract to produce an amount corresponding
to its capacIty relative to that of the field as a whole, while stipulating that no
tract would be limited to fewer than 100 barrels of daily production. But antiprorationists filed suit, ignored the order, and little changed in the East Texas
field. 17
By this time crude production had reached levels sufficient to affect
prices beyond the state's borders. Like Ross Sterling, Oklahoma Governor
Murray struggled with deteriorating oil prices. Oklahoma operated under a
proration system, but continued unchecked production from the East Texas
field rendered the policy ineffective. Several oil companies shut~in their wells
to await higher prices. The Seminole and Oklahoma City fields were
producing oiL hut at rock-bottom prices. The average price of crude oil in
January 1931 was $.95 per barrel; in August it fell to just $.14.1 per barrel.
Prorationists maintained that regulation was necessary to save reservoirs and
resources; anti-prorationists were equally determined to produce as much oil
as possible. 'R
The dilemma became increasingly vexing in the summer of 1931. Phillips
Petroleum Company president Frank Phillips insisted that the price crisis
resulted from uncontrolled production from the massive East Texas field.
Other explanations failed to explain the price collapse. Domestic petroleum
stocks were 7,000,000 barrels below those of 1930; domestic consumption
roughly equaled that of 1930; and while exports were down, so were imports.
Phillips asserted that with regard to oil prices. "the most potent. specific cause
is lack of control of the great East Texas pool." He concluded that if
regulations could be enforced "the favorable economic conditions elsewhere
prevailing throughout the industry will have an opportunity to make
themselves felt."19
By mid-summer 193 [. the oil price situation had become so desperate
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that Governor Sterling called a special session of the Texas legislature.
Sterling said that "there exists a deplorable condition in Texas on account of
the great waste of our natural resources, particularly oil and gas, and there is
an urgent demand for a strengthening of our conservation laws." The governor
outlined the action he wanted: "enact such legislation as will adequately
provide for the conservation of the natural resources of our State [sic]." The
session lasted from July 14 to August 12,1931; temperatures rose in the unair-conditioned Texas capitol as legislators began work. Before remedial

legislation could be acted upon, Odessa Representative Lee Satterwhite put
before the House a resolution requiring the House OiL Gas, and Mining
Committee and the Senate State Affairs Committee to investigate the activities
of major oil companies in the East Texas field. The resulting hearings allowed
lawmakers to spread their own gospel regarding the oil industry upon the
pages of the House and Senate journals. Testifying before the House
committee, company president William S. Farish stated that Humble Oil had
no power to set prices and posted no prices in the East Texas field. According
to Farish, 252 minor operators owned forty-seven percent of the wells in the
field and, because Humble purchased it.'\ production on an individual basis,
prices fluctuated freely. Robert Penn recommended immediate proration for
all flush, or flowing, wells. Former governor Pat Neff, a minority of one on the
three-member railroad commission, shredded his fellow commissioners,
Chairman C.V. Terrell and Commissioner Lon A. Smith, accusing them of
"Physical inactivity, mental inertness, rof] following the line of least
resistance, in prorating only those who wanted to be prorated - without an
intelligent gesture toward proration." The hearings occupied much of the
members' time and featured the governor as a witness before each of the two
committees. Sterling scuttled an attempt to link him to Humble Oil by rumor
of a kickback disguised as a mysterious loan. The alleged "loan" proved to be
an advance royalty payment on a producing well that Humble drilled in 1930
on property that Sterling and two partners owned.:o
Despite the posturing of both investigative committees, minerals
conservation proposals made their way through the legislative process. TWo
important issues had to be decided by lawmakers: whether to establish a new
conservation commission and whether proration should be limited to physical
waste, economic waste (market demand), or expanded to a combination of the
two criteria. Identical administration bills, the Woodward Bill in the Senate
and the Wagstaff Bill in the House, provided for effective conservation
measures. The bills set forth the duties of the government in preventing
physical waste, prescribed severe penalties for violators, and established a new
conservation commission to relieve the railroad commission of its oil and gas
oversight duties. ll
Amid both legitimate legislative debate and headline-grabbing committee
hearing testimony, a three-judge federal court handed down a crucial ruling.
On July 28, 1931, in A(fred Macmillan, et. al. v. Texas Railroad Commission,
the court held invalid the commission's earlier proration order covering the
East Texas field. In the court's opinion, the order had no reasonable relation to
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physical waste, was based on market demand, and violated the state's
conservation laws. Moreover, the court ruled that the order deprived the
plaintiffs of property without due process of law, impaired obligations under
contracts, and impeded interstate commerce. In response to the ruling,
Governor Sterling promised to veto any act that used market demand as a
criteria for proration. The prorationists were bewildered, the anti-prorationists
elated. Before Texas legislators could react to the federal court ruling, events
north of the Red River heightened the tension. 22
In Oklahoma, Governor Murray told oil companies that he was prepared
to declare martial law on August 1, 1931, to raise and support the price of oil.
His threat proved counterproductive, because beginning at 12:01 A.M" August
1, producers opened their wells full stream, producing as much crude as they
could prior to the anticipated shut-down. On August 4, the governor proved
that he was a man of his word, sending the National Guard into the oil fields.
In his declaration of martial law, Murray accused Sinclair Oil Company
officials of "holding numerous secret meetings with seditious intent and
intrigue, against the State Government" [sic]. One of these secret meetings
was held in the city of Tulsa last March ... to consider the possibility of
bribing forty members of the Legislature and impeaching the Governor."
Murray alleged that Sinclair's "intrigues" were specifically designed to drive
the price of oil through the floor "against the best interests of the school
children of the State." In Texas, events forced businessman-governor Ross
Sterling to adopt similarly extreme measures to control oil production. 2)
After the MacMillan ruling, the Texas legislature enacted a compromise
conservation bill. House Bill No. 25, dubbed the Anti-Market Demand Act,
authorized the Railroad Commission to regulate mineral conservation by
clearly defining physical waste, permitted the commission to use gas-oil ratio
and water encroachment as criteria in determining production limits~ and
provided for criminal penalties for those violating commission orders. 24
Apprehension permeated the East Texas field following the adjournment
of the legislature on August 12. Passage of the Anti-Market Demand Act
implied to some that railroad commission proration orders issued under the old
law had been rescinded and that East Texas oil could be produced at maximum
flow. The price had slumped to $.14.1 per barrel and desperate or unscrupulous
producers were planning to open the valves. A group of operators who had
voluntarily shut-in their wells met at Tyler on Friday, August 14, to discuss the
crisis. In the months since the anti-proration rally in Austin, Tyler Journal
editor Carl Estes had experienced an epiphany and now supported production
controls. The 1,500 people who attended the meeting in TYler adopted a
resolution petitioning the governor to impose martial law in the field so that
"enormous physical waste .. , and huge loss to the State of Texas be prevented
and that life and property may be safe during this hiatus of the conservation
law of the State." The petitioners appointed five of their number to drive to
Governor Sterling's home south of Houston, present him with the petition, and
plead their cause. On the same Friday afternoon, the East Texas Chamber of
Commerce, also meeting in Tyler, telegraphed the governor and asked him to
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declare martial law immediately in the East Texas field. As did those 1,500
souls in the operators' group, chamber members protested the "unequal
productionH in the field and stressed that "conditions had already resulted and
caused threats of violence and the destruction of property."~5
Ross Sterling spent the weekend of August 14-16, 1931, preparing for
martial law in East Texas; so did a number of oil producers, While Sterling
visited with the five representatives from Tyler on Saturday morning, East
Texas wells spewed forth crude at the rate of more than one million barrels per
day. Sterling knew that the petitioners had not overstated their case. He had
had a "mole" in the field for some time, Oil Weekly publisher Ray L. Dudley,
who confinned the severity of the situation. The governor drove to Austin
Saturday afternoon to sign the proclamation. He mobilized National Guard
cavalrymen in Austin, Brenham, Dallas, 'lYler. Fort Worth, Houston, and
Mineral Wells for service in East Texas where they would join Texas Ranger
Captain Tom Hickman and ten other Rangers. The governor placed guardsmen
under the command of Brigadier General Jacob F. Wolters, who, in his nonmilitary role served as staff attorney for The Texas Company. 26
A new chapter in oil regulation began at 6:00 A.M., Monday, August 17,
1931, when the governor's martial law declaration went into effect and
national guardsmen and Texas Rangers closed more than 1600 wells in the
East Texa~ field. General Wolters arrived in Kilgore at approximately 8:20
A.M. and by 11 :00, all Humble Oil and all Texas Company wells had been
shut down. Wolters warned would-be violators of the consequences:
"Resistance to the law is insurrection. That's war, whether it be armed or not."
Troops met little resistance, and by Monday night Wolters announced that the
shutdown had been accomplished without violence. Closure of the Black
Giant had been affected swiftly, but no one could say how long the field would
remain sealed. 17
The railroad commission issued a new proration order for the East Texas
field on September 2, 1931, to take effect September 5. Governor Sterling
thought the order so loosely constructed as to be worthless. Commissioners
modified the order and Sterling permitted the field to reopen, under the
supervision of General Wolters. As drilling continued in the field, production
inched toward the 400,000 barrel per day limit. Commissioners amended their
order by lowering the per-well daily allowable twice to remain below the field
limit. This arrangement worked well. 28
On October 13, 1931, several small operators obtained an injunction in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas halting
enforcement of the commission's proration order and enjoining the
commission from issuing a similar order. But the suit did not name Sterling as
a defendant, so to maintain martial law and production limits, the governor
assumed personal control of the field, immediately reducing the daily per-well
production limit from 165 to 150 barrels. On November 20, the plaintiffs
amended their suit to include Sterling and Wolters as defendants. On February
18, 1932, after a three-day hearing, the Federal District Court held that
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Sterling had overstepped his authority in declaring martial law. 29
Martial law had expired, but the principle for which the governor enacted
it survived. In 1932, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals released its opinion in
the Danciger case. The court held that production in excess of market demand
did result in physical waste l and that limiting production to market demand
diminished or eliminated that waste. The August 27, 1930, railroad
commission proration order had thus been ruled legal, Also in 1932, the United
States Supreme Court, in a ruling rendered in Champlin Refining Company v.
Oklahoma Corporation Commission, upheld an Oklahoma proration law that
relied upon market demand to restrict production. In essence, the Texas Court
of Civil Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed market demand as a
criterion for physical waste prevention. On November 12, 1932, Governor
Sterling signed into law the Market Demand Act, the result of a special
legislative session. Ross Sterling had been vindicated. 10
Ross Sterling was an oilman - he understood the petroleum industry, and
as a corporate executive believed in non-interventionist government. But as
governor he discovered that his laissez faire policy did not always work. The
oil crisis forced Sterling to reexamine his beliefs. The process of evolving
from an autocratic executive and state commission chairman to a chief
executive, responsible for crafting compromise among contentious factions,
combined with the political and economic exigencies of the times, altered
Sterling's perspective of government's role in business affairs. As he said to
Texas senators during the legislative oil investigations of July 1931: "A few
years ago [ made it plain [that] I was opposed to too much government in
husiness, but conditions have changed, and it is now necessary for the
government to come to the aid of the oil industry.''' I
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